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Abstract
A key challenge in Web services security is the design 
of effective access control schemes that can adequately 
meet the unique security challenges posed by the Web 
services paradigm. Despite the recent advances in Web 
based access control approaches applicable to Web 
services, there remain issues that impede the 
development of effective access control models for 
Web services environment. Amongst them are the lack 
of context-aware models for access control, and 
reliance on identity or capability-based access control 
schemes. In this paper, we motivate the design of an 
access control scheme that addresses these issues, and 
propose an extended, trust-enhanced version of our 
XML-based Role Based Access Control (X-RBAC) 
framework that incorporates context-based access 
control. We outline the configuration mechanism 
needed to apply our model to the Web services 
environment, and also describe the implementation 
architecture for the system. 
Keywords: XML, Role-Based Access Control, Trust 
Management, Web-Services 
1. Introduction 
Security in Web services is critical to their wide-
scale adoption and integration in Web-based enterprise 
systems and softwares. The present day Web is abound 
with examples of Web-based enterprise services, and 
there is an increasing trend amongst them to migrate to 
the Web services platform in order to enhance and 
diversify the online services provided to their 
customers. While shifting from the traditional client-
server architecture to Web services technology is seen 
as an endorsement of the Internet community’s faith in 
the promise of the Web services paradigm, the goals of 
interoperability and ubiquity as envisioned by the Web 
services technology can only reasonably be realized if 
the unique security challenges posed by this paradigm 
are appropriately addressed. Among these challenges 
is to develop models for effective access control in 
dynamic XML-based Web services. The uniqueness 
here comes from the fact that the Web-based enterprise 
resources being exposed via Web services are typically 
dynamic and distributed in nature, and hence require 
adaptive access control models that can capture the 
dynamically changing security requirements of the 
target enterprise.
The mechanisms required to effectively enforce 
access control across distributed, heterogeneous 
domains are becoming increasingly complex. This 
complexity arises not only because of the sheer size of 
the distributed clientele accessing online services but 
also because of the fact that access control system 
should capture security-relevant contextual 
information, such as time, location, or environmental 
state available at the time the access requests are made, 
and incorporate it in its access control decisions. These 
context parameters capture the dynamically changing 
access requirements in a Web-based enterprise, and 
hence are critical to the effectiveness of the resulting 
access control scheme. The context directly affects the 
level of trust associated with a user, and hence the 
authorizations granted to him/her. These parameters 
constitute what is generally termed as a “user profile”. 
The access privileges of requestors to an online service 
provider could be based on certain thresholds as 
established by the System Security Officer (SSO) 
based on the requestor’s access patterns. If at any time, 
a requestor appears to deviate from his/her usual 
profile, the thresholds (i.e. the trust level) would 
automatically be reduced as a precaution to prevent a 
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requirement, and is exceedingly important in dynamic 
Web services serving thousands of customers with 
diverse activity profiles. In order for the access control 
to be effectively exercised in such scenarios with 
context-sensitive access requirements, the traditional 
access control models must be extended to make them 
context-aware. To this end, we propose to employ the 
generalized temporal extension to our X-RBAC [1] 
model, the XML-based Generalized Temporal Role 
Based Access Control (X-GTRBAC) model [2]. X-
GTRBAC was originally proposed as a solution to 
enterprise-wide access control, but due to its XML-
based framework, it can also be configured to provide 
access control in Web services. In Section 3, we 
introduce the reader to the X-GTRBAC model and 
outline the mechanism to extend X-GTRBAC as a 
context-aware access control framework for Web 
services environment. 
Another issue we highlight in the paper is trust-
based role assignment to users. There are different 
(although related) notions of “trust” in the literature.  
The one that is relevant to our purposes is the level of 
confidence associated with a user based on certain 
certified attributes thereof. In our framework, this level 
of confidence is not quantitatively reported. Instead, 
we rely on the Trust Management (TM) approach of 
trusted third parties (such as any PKI CA
1), and use the 
certification provided by them to assign roles to users. 
We derive our motivation for doing that from the 
review of traditional access control schemes that have 
adopted either an identity or capability-based approach 
to authorize users [1, 3-7]. Such mechanisms do not 
scale well to the distributed Web services architecture, 
and hence would cause a significant burden to be 
attached to the enforcement of the access control 
scheme. This is because each credential needs an 
explicit delegation act by the respective domain 
administrators. In order to overcome this limitation, we 
outline a mechanism to incorporate trust in X-
GTRBAC model in Section 3. In particular, we would 
use TM credentials (i.e. certificates) to allow trust 
establishment amongst distributed domains.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
We begin by providing a compendium of related work 
in the area of Web services security, and discuss how 
our framework aligns with the existing security 
architectures. We also review the features provided by 
existing Web-based access control schemes, and their 
suitability to Web services. We next introduce our 
                                                          
1 Public Key Encryption Certification Authority
trust-based context-aware access control model, which 
is based on a temporal extension of X-RBAC with 
trust domains incorporated into it. The paper concludes 
with the discussion of implementation architecture of 
our model and an overview of future research goals. 
2. Background and Related Work 
We shall now provide a background and 
compendium of current state of the art in Web services 
security. A fair amount of related research in this area 
is due to the industry, with standards such as Security 
Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [8] and 
eXtensible Access Control Markup Language 
(XACML) [9] being recently adopted. SAML defines 
an XML framework for exchanging authentication and 
authorization information for securing Web services, 
and relies on third-party authorities for provision of 
“assertions” containing such information. XACML is 
an XML framework for specifying access control 
policies for Web-based resources, and with significant 
extensions can potentially be applied to secure Web 
services. The XACML specification supports identity-
based access control and incorporates some contextual 
information, such as location and time, into access 
decisions, without any formal context-aware access 
control model. There also are other emerging 
specifications, most notable amongst them are the ones 
outlined in WS security roadmap [10]. The roadmap 
consists of a number of component specifications, the 
core amongst them are WS-Security, WS-Policy, and 
WS-Trust. WS-Security is similar in intent and 
purpose to SAML, only uses a different technology. 
WS-Policy is used to describe the security policies in 
terms of their characteristics and supported features 
(such as required “security tokens”, encryption 
algorithms, privacy rules, etc.). WS-Trust defines a 
trust model that allows for exchange of such security 
tokens (using mechanisms provided by WS-Security) 
in order to enable the issuance and dissemination of 
credentials within different trust domains, and establish 
online trust relationships. The models proposed in the 
roadmap have been directed primarily at the 
authentication aspect of Web services security, with an 
emphasis on designing secure messaging protocols to 
communicate the security-relevant information, such as 
security tokens and characteristics of security policy. 
The specification leaves room for custom authorization 
models to be tied into the architecture at the 
appropriate (i.e. WS-Policy) level. In this paper, we 
present an access control model that is capable of 
doing exactly that; our XML-based framework allows 
easy integration into the existing XML-based 
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Element Type    Element Name  Purpose
XML User Sheet (XUS)  Declares the users and their authorization credentials 
XML Role Sheet (XRS)  Declares the roles, their attributes, role hierarchy, and any 
separation of duty and temporal constraints associated with roles 
RBAC Element 
XML Permission Sheet (XPS)  Declares the available permissions 
XML User-to-Role Assignment Sheet 
(XURAS) 
Defines the rules for assignment of users to roles; these 
assignments may have associated temporal constraints 
RBAC
Assignments
XML Permission-to-Role Assignment 
Sheet (XPRAS) 
Defines the rules for assignment of permissions to roles; these 
assignments may have associated temporal constraints 
RBAC  Constraints  XML Separation Of Duty Definition 
Sheet (XSoDDef) 
Defines the separation of duty constraints on roles 
XML Temporal Constraint Definition 
Sheet (XTempConstDef) 
Defines the temporal constraints on role enabling and activation; 
also defines temporal constraints for user-to-role and permission-
to-role assignments 
GTRBAC
Constraints
XML Trigger Definition Sheet 
(XTrigDef) 
Defines context-based  triggers for invocation of periodic events 
subject to associated constraint evaluation 
Authorization 
Credentials
XML Credential Type Definition Sheet 
(XCredTypeDef) 
Defines the available credential types 
architectures for Web services security, while 
providing an effective authorization mechanism 
suitable for Web services environment.  
There has been an effort in the research community 
to highlight the challenges in Web-based access 
control within the XML framework, including both the 
initial DTD-based solutions [3-6], and the more recent 
schema-based approaches [1, 7]. In [1], we have 
presented X-RBAC, an XML-based RBAC policy 
specification framework for enforcing access control in 
dynamic XML-based Web services. X-RBAC was 
designed to readily integrate within the XML 
framework, and emphasized simple, yet effective, 
administration through the use of RBAC. We also 
maintained that X-RBAC includes a comprehensive set 
of features that is comparable to the related access 
control schemes cited above, and is targeted for the 
Web services environment. Although X-RBAC and 
related schemes provide viable solutions, there remain 
issues that impede the development of effective access 
control models for Web services environment. 
Amongst them are the lack of context-aware models 
for access control, and reliance on identity or 
capability-based access control schemes. We next 
elaborate upon these issues, and propose an extended 
and trust-enhanced version of our X-RBAC model in 
an attempt to address them. 
3. Trust–Enhanced X-GTRBAC Model 
This section begins with an introduction to the X-
GTRBAC model. It then describes the mechanism to 
configure X-GTRBAC to provide context-aware trust-
based access control in Web services.  
3.1. X-GTRBAC- An Introduction 
The X-GTRBAC framework is based on 
Generalized Temporal Role Based Access Control 
(GTRBAC) model [11]. X-GTRBAC augments 
GTRBAC with XML to allow for supporting the 
policy enforcement in an heterogeneous, distributed 
environment. GTRBAC extends the widely accepted 
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) model proposed 
in the NIST RBAC standard [12]. RBAC uses the 
concept of roles to embody a collection of permissions 
within an organizational setup. Permissions are 
associated with roles through a permission-to-role 
assignment, and the users are granted access to 
resources through a user-to-role assignment [13]. 
GTRBAC provides a generalized mechanism to 
express a diverse set of fine-grained temporal 
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assignments in order to meet the dynamic access 
control requirements of an enterprise. X-GTRBAC 
allows specification of all the elements of the 
GTRBAC model. These specifications are captured 
through a context-free grammar called X-Grammar, 
which follows the same notion of terminals and non-
terminals as in BNF, but supports the tagging notation 
of XML that also allows expressing attributes within 
element tags. The detailed specification of these 
elements of X-GTRBAC framework can be found in 
[2]. Table 1 enlists the salient features of the model. 
We now describe the mechanism to configure X-
GTRBAC to provide context-aware trust-based access 
control in Web services. Toward that end, we need to 
outline a set of formal specifications to capture 
contextual information, and illustrate how it can be 
incorporated within the access control model. In 
addition, we would need to provide an interface to the 
system to accept TM credentials instead of its usual 
user credentials as the basis of privilege assignments. 
3.2 Context-aware access control 
This section defines the set of specifications needed 
to configure X-GTRBAC for context-aware access 
control in Web services environment. We base our set 
of specifications on a tuple language that can be 
readily mapped onto our existing XML-based 
framework. In the following, we provide the formal 
definition of context, and then use that to provide the 
definition for a service_access_request. In order to 
formalize the context, we introduce a type system to 
allow specifying domains of legal values for various 
context parameters. Our formal model relies on the 
components we define below: 
Parameter Name Set: A set PN to denote the possible 
names of context parameters 
Parameter Type Set:  A set PT to denote the possible 
types of context parameters 
Context Parameter:   A context parameter is 
represented by a data structure p, having the following 
fields: name  PN, type  PT, and a function 
getValue().
Roles Set:  RR = {rr1, …. , rrk}, where rri, 1ik
is a regular role
2 in GTRBAC 
Operations Set: RO = {ro1, …. , rok}, where rok, 1ik
is a regular operation in GTRBAC
                                                          
2 We introduced the term regular role in [17] to differentiate it from 
an administrative role. 
Service: A service is an abstraction of the operations 
provided by the system on its resources. Formally, a 
service is a subset of the data set RO, and is designated 
by the service name srv that is defined according to 
the  wsdl:service element of the WebServices 
Description Language (WSDL) document 
Services Set:   SRVS = {srv1, …. , srv k}, where srvi
, 1ik is a service. 
Definition 1: (Context): A context set C consists of n
context parameters {p1, …. , pn}, n 0, s.t. for any pi,
pj, with i  j and 1  i, j  n, we have that pi.name 
pj.name (i.e. the parameter names must be distinct). 
We mention here that PN and PT constitute a set 
of pre-specified parameter names and types determined 
by the SSO. For example, the set PN may be defined 
as: PN = {time_of_day, location, 
duration, system_load}, with the 
corresponding set PT defined as: PT ={Time,
String, Long, Integer}. The 
p.getValue() function is used to dynamically 
compute the value of the parameter, and its 
implementation is system-dependent. For built-in 
system parameters, such as time_of_day, it might 
just serve as a wrapper around system functions such 
as getCurrentTime(). The dynamic mechanism to 
compute parameter values especially helps in the case 
of mobile users accessing Web-based services, because 
in such environments the parameter values are 
constantly changing and may need to be re-evaluated 
at certain intervals. Additionally, for dynamic access 
constraints, such as duration, getValue() would 
be called periodically to ensure that the constraint is 
always satisfied. We also note from the preceding 
definition that the context may be an empty set. 
Definition 2: (Service_access_request): A service 
access request is defined as a triple <role, srv,
context> where role  RR, srv  SRVS,
and context is defined according to Definition 1 
and captured dynamically at the time of the access 
request.  
Based on the service_access_request, the system 
determines the applicable access policy for the 
requested service. This policy will be based on a set of 
constraints on the role and service name, and evaluated 
in conjunction with the available contextual 
information to enforce fine grained access control. An 
access policy consists of a collection of access 
conditions. In order to formulate an access condition, 
we refer to the notion of parameterized roles of [2]. 
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Input: role, srv, C //C is context array
Output: decision d d{YES, NO, PENDING, N/A}
 1: CL[] = getClauses(role,srv)
 2. A[] = getAttributesSet(role) 
 3.  FOR i = 1 to length(CL) DO
    clause = CL[i]
 access = getDecision(clause,A,C) 
         IF access = false
  return  NO
4: IF access = true
  return  YES
Algorithm: getDecision
Input: clause,A,C
Output: result //boolean
 1. initizalize(result[])
 2. FOR i = 1 to size(clause) DO
expr = clause.getExpr(i) 
result[i]=evaluateExpr(expr,A,C)
 3. return computeResult(result[]) 
Algorithm: EvaluateExpression
Input: expr, A, C
Output: result //boolean
1. name = expr.getAttrName() 
2. attr = getAttribute(A,name) 
3. result = checkCondition(attr, C) 
4.    return result
Algorithm: checkCondition
Input: attr, C
Output: result //boolean
1. p=match(C,attr)
IF p.getValue()￿ val 
result = true   
     ELSE 
     result = false   
2.: return result
Parameterized roles are roles supplemented with 
role_attributes. The attributes set A of a role contains a 
collection of contextual attributes (such as time, 
location or system load) that may be used to define 
context-based conditions on roles. The values of these 
attributes are specified by the SSO, and these values 
are compared with the values of the supplied context 
parameters in order to evaluate an access request. The 
set of contextual attributes of a role is hence a subset 
of the set C of context parameters, and follows the 
same type system. We formally define the 
access_policy below. We assume the existence of a 
function  getAttributesSet(role), which 
returns the set A for a given role. 
Definition 3: (Access Policy): Let r  RR be a role,
srv  SRVS be a service name denoting a service. The 
access policy AP for a (r, srv) pair is a set of clauses, 
where each clause is a Boolean combination of 
expressions. An expression is of the form <attr ￿
val> where attr is a role attribute s.t. attr
getAttributesSet(r), val is the value of the 
parameter as specified by the SSO in order for role r to 
access the service srv, and ￿ is any relational 
comparison operator. 
It may be mentioned that we have intentionally kept 
our model generic enough, as it is unlikely for any one 
model to capture all types of contextual information 
and associated conditions that might arise in practice. 
But for most practical purposes, the sets PN, PT and 
role_attributes may be extended according to the 
system requirements in order to define access 
conditions based on appropriate context parameters.  
We now give the following set of algorithms to 
evaluate a service_access_request.
The ComputeAccess algorithm works as 
follows. In Step 1, the clauses corresponding to the 
(role,srv) pair are retrieved from the AP into a 
dynamic array CL. Step 2 retrieves the attributes of 
the role into a dynamic array A. In Step 3, the 
algorithm loops over the array CL and calls the routine 
getDecision() for each of the clauses. Each 
clause has potentially multiple expressions, and so 
each expression is evaluated using the 
evaluateExpr() routine. For each expression, 
this routine retrieves the attribute from the attribute 
array  A and then calls the routine 
checkCondition() to evaluate the conditions 
corresponding to this role attribute. This routine loops 
over the set C of supplied context parameters and finds 
the matching context parameter for this role attribute 
by calling the match() routine, which internally 
compares the name and type of the two entities. Since 
the set A is a subset of set C, this search always results 
in a match. When a match is found, it compares their 
values according to the operator specified in the AP. If 
the condition is satisfied, a value of true is returned to 
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conditions within the clause has been computed, the 
getDecision routine then computes the overall 
result for the clause and returns it to 
ComputeAccess. If any of the clauses evaluates to 
false, a NO is returned as the output of the
ComputeAccess algorithm, because the overall 
access decision is a conjunction of all individual 
clauses. Otherwise, after the loop terminates 
successfully over all the clauses, a YES is returned. 
Other decisions such as PENDING or N/A may also 
be returned by incorporating system-specific logic into 
the algorithm. 
As an illustration, consider the example of a 
recently launched initiative of a German insurance 
company [14]. The company leverages Web services 
technology to introduce online visitors to its services, 
and allows them to purchase insurance coverage 
through an entirely digital process. The evaluation of 
an online coverage request requires several kinds of 
personal information to be made available, and the 
same needs to persist in the company’s database for a 
subsequent evaluation of an insurance claim. At that 
point, however, the access to the customer’s resources 
should only be granted after establishing the fact that 
the requestor indeed is “the” genuine customer. For 
instance, assume that the following 
service_access_request is submitted for evaluation to 
the system: 
<role=priv_cust,
service_name=”review_claim”,
context={p1{time,12PM},
p2{location,”WashDC”},p3{duration,
0},p4{system_load,”low”}>.
This request says that a user belonging to the 
priv_cust (privileged customer) role has requested 
to review an online insurance claim through the Web-
based review_claim service offered by the 
company. The context recorded at the time of access 
request is provided to the system as part of the request. 
Note that duration is initialized to 0 because the 
access has not yet started. Now, assume that the 
following AP is applicable to the given (role, srv)
pair: 
 {< CL1> , < CL2 >, < CL3> , < CL4 >} 
s.t.
CL1: {time > 9AM} AND {time < 5PM)
CL2: {location = “WashDC”} OR 
{location = “NewYork”}
CL3: {system_load != “high”> 
CL4: {duration  600s}
Based on this information, the system would return 
an authorization decision for this 
service_access_request. The available contextual 
information indicates that the access conditions are 
satisfied. In addition, due to the duration constraint 
specified for the requested service and enforced by the 
dynamic temporal constraint mechanism of GTRBAC, 
the access duration of the user is continuously 
monitored, and any violation thereof is detected on a 
per-user basis by the GTRBAC Processor (see Table 
2). The mechanism to deal with the violation is system-
specific, but GTRBAC allows a trigger mechanism to 
take immediate actions in such situations (such as de-
activating the role for the given user). Detailed 
discussion on such mechanisms can be found in [2]. 
3.3 Incorporating trust domains 
In this section, we briefly describe a mechanism to 
incorporate trust domains in X-GTRBAC to enable 
effective access control in a distributed environment, 
where user identities are not known a-priori. Since X-
GTRBAC makes the access decisions based on the 
eligible roles for known users, we can use TM 
credentials to assign roles to users. While it is 
sometimes viewed as appropriate in TM to adopt a 
direct authorization model, i.e. to combine 
authentication and access control into one 
authorization step [15], we would like to motivate here 
that the indirection through roles helps scalability and 
flexibility in the case of large scale open systems, 
especially Web services. Hence, a significant 
advantage that accompanies the role-based approach 
adopted in our framework is that of simplified 
authorization administration [13]. An earlier approach 
that merged features from TM and RBAC, called the 
Role based Trust management framework (RT), was 
reported in [16]. However, our primary goals are 
different from RT. The latter is primarily a TM 
credential exchange and distribution mechanism to 
assist authorizations in a distributed environment; it 
does not support an elaborate access control scheme 
beyond the basic permission-to-role assignment 
mechanism in RBAC. We focus on providing a 
context-aware access control model for the Web 
services environment, and rely on TM credentials for 
determining the trust level (i.e. role) associated with a 
user. As mentioned in the introduction, the trust level 
can be subsequently adjusted based on the user’s 
activity profile. Such a profile can be maintained by 
logging the contextual information associated with the 
invocation and acceptance of a 
service_access_request.
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 Module  Name  Description
Document Composition Module (DCM)  Used to compose the policy documents; contains the  XML-Policy Base that 
serves as the document repository; is an external component of the model 
Policy Loader  The interface of the system to the DCM; used to load the XML policy files 
into the system 
Policy Validation Module  Validates the XML policy files for existence checking and type conformance 
according to policy rules; XML syntax validation is also implicitly done 
XML processor  Contains an XML parser that generates the DOM tree representation of the 
XML policy files 
GTRBAC Processor  Contains a GTRBAC Module that translates the DOM tree representation to 
internal RBAC data structures representing the system state at any time; 
maintains logs of sessions and updates the system data structures to allow 
contextual information to be incorporated in access decisions 
The use of TM credentials to establish role 
memberships of users requires the X-GTRBAC model 
to be adapted to accept distributed TM credentials. We 
touch upon the mechanisms needed to do this in the 
next section, but leave an elaborate treatment of the 
same for some future work, as it is not the focus of our 
current paper. It may be noted here that the trust-based 
approach to verifying user credentials effectively adds 
authentication support to our existing authorization 
model. 
4. Implementation Architecture 
There is an on-going effort underway on extending 
our implementation prototype, first reported in [1]. The 
major components of X-GTRBAC system architecture 
are summarized in Table 2. The existing prototype 
incorporates the temporal constraint enforcement 
mechanism as per the GTRBAC model. The 
generalization of the contextual information to include 
parameters other than time as described in the paper is 
being incorporated into the system. We are also 
working toward a set of specifications that would 
allow us to substitute the existing credential evaluation 
mechanism with that involving TM credentials. 
Because of the modular design of X-GTRBAC, this 
task can be accomplished with only slight 
modifications in the overall architecture. The 
components affected would be (i) the XML Policy 
Base, since it would now need to store a different 
XCredTypeDef sheet based on TM credentials, and (ii) 
the XML Processor, since it would now employ a 
different evaluation logic for processing credential 
declarations. Our set of specifications would be XML-
based, and hence can be expected to integrate well 
with the existing framework. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have outlined a mechanism to 
develop a trust-based, context-aware access control 
model for Web services based on the X-GTRBAC 
framework. X-GTRBAC is a temporal extension of the 
earlier X-RBAC model for access control in Web 
services. The mechanism presented in the paper 
extends X-GTRBAC to support context-aware access 
control based on both temporal and non-temporal 
contextual conditions. In addition, we outline a 
mechanism to incorporate trust domains into X-
GTRABC by the use of distributed TM credentials for 
unknown users. Such an approach effectively adds 
authentication support to our system. We have 
discussed the configuration of X-GTRBAC for its 
application in Web services environments, and also 
proposed extensions to our current implementation 
architecture for the purposes outlined in this paper. We 
intend to report the detailed results of our on-going 
implementation efforts in some future work. We also 
plan to explore the interplay of contextual conditions 
in the presence of separation of duty constraints and 
role hierarchies. In these situations, it is critical to 
ensure that the access to services based on inherited 
permissions do not violate any separation of duty 
constraints. Another future direction of research would 
be to investigate the suitability of the proposed 
administration model for X-GTRBAC [17] to Web 
services. We expect to see our framework evolve with 
time, as Web services standards are continually being 
Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Web Services (ICWS’04) 
0-7695-2167-3/04 $ 20.00 IEEE enhanced, and would likely incorporate additional 
security mechanisms such as secure messaging and 
transaction support into our system. Along related 
lines, it would be desirable to design a framework to 
evaluate security properties of a Web service based on 
the existing and emerging Web services specifications. 
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